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Abstract 
Weapon systems that function destructively (e.g. missile or 
torpedo) are to be acquired in a lot of size m. Acceptance of the lot 
is based on the result of an operational test, administered to part of 
the lot: if the test results indicate positive operational value the lot 
is accepted and the remaining part of the lot if fielded; otherwise 
the lot is “rejected”. 
A test plan is designed that establishes an optimal number of 
weapon copies to test, given (models of) the operational gain of the 
fielded weapon under two tactical options, and the uncertainty in 
the weapon’s predicted probability of success after the test is 
complete. The major test objective is to realize possible operational 
utility from the lot of items, and secondarily to demonstrate 
arbitrary levels of certainty. 
I 
Methodology for an 
Operationally-Based Test Length Decision 
Donald P. Gaver 
Patricia A. Jacobs 
1. Problem Formulation 
A new, or upgraded, item (for example, but not necessarily, a weapon) is to 
be produced and introduced into service provided it passes a test of its 
effectiveness and suitability. The test envisioned consists of employing the item 
in a typical mission and assessing the outcome as a success or failure. Tests are 
destructive: each test means that the tested item is lost, but its record is available: 
summarized as either success or failure. It is recognized that a more sensitive 
measure that accounts for degree of success, such as miss distance, may be 
available and preferable, but treatment of this option is deferred for the present. 
Likewise, non-destructive and reliability-growth settings can receive similar 
treatment; for discussion of a reliability growth problem in a similar context, see 
Gaver and Jacobs (1997). 
Suppose that rn items will be produced or bought in a lot. An option is to test 
f (0 < t < m) of them and choose whether to accept or reject the entire lot on the 
basis of the test. Clearly a small test (e.g. based on firing a few missiles, perhaps 
2) conveys less information about the item than does a larger one. But a large test 
means that only a few are left for field deployment. We intend to provide a 
formulation that links the information provided by a test to the effect of that 
information upon eventual operational performance. We indicate that it is also 
possible to affect the decision as to how the item is "best" employed in the field, 
i.e. to assess the value based on simple tactical changes. The present formulation 
is intentionally simplified, but it forces a choice that is often only implicit in 
practice. The general methodology can be extended to include many more 
realistic details. We plan to do so in subsequent work. 
2. Uncertainty, Information, and Operational Gain 
Assume that the item has a constant but unknown probability of success, p .  
Whether to field a weapon depends on the value of p,  which will ultimately be 
revealed, but still with uncertainty, with the assistance of a physical operational 
test. An option is to make f ( t  either 0 (no tests), 1,2, ... rn) tests and then decide 
whether p seems to be large enough. (Note that if t = rn maximum information 
will be procured, but nothing is left for use!) 
Whether p is large enough can be based on a model of the weapon 
effectiveness as used operationally. The following is a simple option: when the 
weapon is actually used it is fired at an opponent; the latter, if missed, has the 
option to fire back. Letting vw be the value of a win, meaning a weapon kill of the 
enemy target, and vl being the value of a loss, possibly meaning the loss of the 
weapon-firing platform, and q being the success probability of enemy counterfire 
(assumed known for simplicity), then 
G(PA 4 = (m - t)[v,p - v&- P)4]  (2.1) 
is the total expected gain from fielding a weapon with success probability p 
having made t tests, so (rn - t)  future engagements are actually possible. One can 
also account for the cost, and/or availability, of the actual missile; this is not 
done here. 
2 
The subscript on G1 signifies that 1 weapon firing will occur per engagement. 
Alternatively we can contemplate firing a 2-weapon salvo, in which case we put 
where Lxl is the largest integer less than or equal to x.  Another option is shoot- 
look-shoot, and there are many others; these are not considered in this paper. 
The above, of course, is conditional on the particular operational setup 
envisioned, perhaps importantly characterized by range of engagement, but also 
target type, relative orientation, altitude, and other factors. Certainly both 
(unknown) p ,  and response probability, q,  may depend sensitively on such 
conditions. In what follows we assyme that all tests are conducted under one set 
of operational conditions and target tactics. 
There are many different and more elaborate options for expression of net 
gain, but analysis of the above is itself instructive. A basic issue is, of course, how’ 
to specify numerical values for the gain and loss parameters, uw and ui, or at least 
their ratio. Most literally, uw could be equated to the monetary cost to an 
opponent of replacement of the item (e.g. targeted platform) that the missile 
attempts to kill; ue represents the same to the missile shooter. More cogently, the 
value chosen for uw should reflect the military value of destroying the targeted 
opponent, this being very large if, for example, the opponent platform threatens 
a major component of one’s own force, such as a battlegroup’s carrier. The 
degree of that threat could be quantitatively assessed by exercise of an 
appropriate wargame or modeling exercise, conducted offline; such an exercise 
could also lead to an appropriate (relative) value for ue. Initially, however, expert 
judgment would likely be used to set tentative values, thus supporting a test 
decision. The inevitable initial subjectivity should stimulate more intensive 
examination of tradeoff issues, and lead to better approaches to quantifymg u, 
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and V J ,  such as by modeling and simulation combined with careful scrutiny of 
historical information. 
Decision Logic 
If the decision maker knows the value of p then he opts not to test (t = 0) and 
presumably evaluates Gi(p, 0; m): if it is (sufficiently) positive he accepts the system 
and fields it, while if it is negative he rejects the system, achieving a gain of zero. 
This is, of course, again oversimplified. For one thing, the particular weapon 
system’s mission might be alternatively performed by a similar predecessor 
system, so the gain of the prospective new item should be compared to that of 
the predecessor. There might also be a quite different alternative to which it 
could be compared. Thus the gain functions above are merely illustrative, 
intended to be provocative and to stimulate analytical thinking (often the most 
important objective of a model). In any case the decision as to whether to accept 
or reject the system often reduces to assessing the evidence that the actual 
probability of success, p ,  exceeds some threshold value, p. For instance for gain 
function G1 it can be seen that in order for the acceptance system to have positive 
gain p = vlq/(v, + vaq) is that threshold. The threshold picked is thus dictated by - 
the actual operational situation envisioned, including opponent response and 
relative platform values. 
Uncertainty in p :  Bayes Approach to Acceptance, Given a Test 
The decision to test 5 leads to acquisition of data assumed entirely 
summarized as s successes (s = 0, 1,2, ..., t). These data can now be used to create 
a likelihood for p by use of a binomial model, and, if p is endowed with a beta 
prior, a beta posterior for p:  
4 
where d = a + s, and p = p + f - s, the values (a, p> characterize the original prior 
density for p .  This is the classical conjugate prior setup, see krger (1985), and is 
invoked for convenient and flexible illustration; other options could be used. 
Then a decision maker in possession of (2.3) should use it to evaluate the gain, 
which can be done by computing its expectation with respect to the posterior 
probability distribution. In the case of GI the linear form gives 
E[Ci(p,t;m)ktf] = (m- f)[VwE[Pls,f]- Q(1- E[Pls,tl)q] (2.4) 
for the expected gain if the system is fielded. An appropriate decision rule may 
be: 
Field the system if E[C;I(p,f;rn)ls,f] is positive; 
otherwise "reject". This is equivalent to fielding if 
€[pls,f] > p = vlq/(vm + viq) . Because of the form of G1 
this is also equivalent to s 2 &). 
- 
How Much to Test 
The previous step indicates what decision to make, given test number f, and 
outcome s ( f )  successes. Now take the position of the decision maker bejore any 
tests are made. She must consider testing to any level, i.e. f = 0,1,2, ..., m. The 
prediction used must depend on the binomial model and upon the prior, which 
is assumed to be the same beta prior with parameters a and p 
z(p) = B(a,p)pa-l(l-p)p-l 
conditional upon p ,  
P{s ( t )  = d p , f }  = (p(1- p ) f -  
(2.5) 
In order to predict s(t)  simply remove the condition on p:  
5 
(2.7) 
The expectation of gain, i.e. E[Gi] depends on s(t), which is unknown at the time 
of test planning, but whose predictive probability distribution is (2.7), the w d -  
known beta-binomial. Consequently predict the expectation of future gain by 
calculating 
r 1 
This can in principle be evaluated for "all" t values, 0, 1, 2, . . .; practically, start 
small and continue while the predicted expected gain first increases and then 
decreases - if it indeed starts small, increases, and then ultimately declines, as 
will often be the case. The optimal test time, f, can then be easily selected. It may 
well happen that an initial prior will be distributed optimistically, suggesting the 
decision not to test at all. Prudence suggests that such a decision be over-ridden, 
if only to try to reveal some totally unanticipated, and modeled,  system flaw. 
Conversely, a test might suggest virtue in a system evaluated very poorly a primi 
It is difficult to imagine that any serious decision maker would accept a new 
system without direct evidence as to its operability. 
3. Acceptance Risk 
In the previous section a procedure to determine a "best" number of tests, t*, 
based on an operationally relevant gain was discussed. In this section we 
consider measures of risk associated with acceptance after t* such tests. Recall 
6 
that acceptance means that s(f*) 2 &*) where s(f*) is the smallest number of 
successes allowed in the f* tests if acceptance is to occur. The measures of risk are 
as follows: 
a) The conditional expected value of the probability of future mission success, 
given Acceptance 
jj( f ) = €[ plAccept] = (3.1) c b(s,f') 
S+) 
where b(s, f )  is defined in (2.7). 
b) The conditional distribution of the number of successes in the remaining 
rn - f* weapons, given Acceptance 
Let M be the number of successes using the remaining (m - f * )  weapons. 
P{ M = kls( c) = s, Accept} 




where b(s, t) is defined in (2.7). It is also instructive to compute the above given 
that the decision rule is overridden: the number of successes fell below &*) but 
the system is accepted despite this fact. 
4. A Two-Weapon Salvo is Fired at a Target 
Once again assume that the weapon has a constant unknown probability of 
success, p .  However, a salvo of two weapons is fired at a target. Presumably, this 
doctrine will allow acceptance of a weapon with a smaller value of p than if only 
one weapon were fired per target. The total expected gain from fielding a 
weapon with success probability p having made t tests, so [(mit)] - future 
engagements are actually possible, is given by Gab, t; rn) in (2.2) where is the 
largest integer less than or equal to x. NOW, however, individual missions are 
twice as costly as before in terms of weapon expenditure. 
We assume in what follows that if t weapons are tested, then they are fired 
one at a time (this may well be poor testing practice). Thus the result of a test that 
fires t weapons is summarized as the number of successes to ocm, dt), (s(t) = 
0,1, . . ., t). In this case the expected gain if the system is fielded given s(t) and t 
Assuming the beta prior distribution, (2.5) as before, the predictive 
distribution of s(t) is given by (2.7). The prediction of the expectation of future 
gain if test t weapons and accept the lot if the number of successes is greater than 
or equal to &) is 
8 
A best number of tests, f;, is that f-value, here f; and ~(f;) that maximizes the 
right-hand side of (4.2). 
Acceptance Risk 
In this section we consider measures of risk associated with acceptance after t* 
tests. Recall acceptance means s(f*) 2g(f*) where &*) is the smallest number of 
successes allowed in the t* tests for acceptance to occur. 
a) The conditional expected value of the probability of future mission success 
given Acceptance, when two weapons are salvoed per target 
. . . \tn. . \ 1 
j j2 ( t )  = El l  - 
L 
I 
where b(s, f) is defined in (2.7). 
b) The conditional distribution of the number of successful target kills in the 
remaining m - t* weapons, given Acceptance, when two weapons are used 
per target 
Let M be the number of successes using the remaining (m - f )  weapons. Since 
two weapons are used per target, N(m, f*) = 1 - 2 * 1 targets can be engaged. 
p*))(l- (1 - p)2)L[ 1 - p,'] N(m,t *)-k P{M = kls, Accept} = I 
k 
9 
x (  r a+b+t* +Zn+ZN(m,tL)-2k) ' j 
P{ M = kls)b( S, f' ) 
s a (  fl) 
P{M = klAccept} = c b(s,f') 
s&(f') 
where b(s,t) is defined in (2.7). Under certain circumstances, e.g. for large 
rn-values, the alternating series form (4.4,b) becomes ill-conditioned, and it is 
preferable to carry out a numerical integration evaluate (4.4,a). 
5. Numerical Examples 
We now exhibit numerical examples to illustrate the theory. Tables 1 - 3 
present results of evaluating best policies and their acceptance risks for both one- 
weapon and two-weapon salvoes. In all the examples the beta prior has mean 
a/a + p = 5 / 4  = 0.83 for a = 5 and /3 = 1. Table 1 presents results for the one- 
weapon salvo for number of missiles in the (small) lot sizes m = 15 and 30; value 
of win, vW = 1; success probability of enemy counterfire q = 0.7; and various 
values of loss, vp. Table 2 presents corresponding results for a two-weapon salvo. 
It is apparent that as the value of loss becomes higher (i.e. at v p =  25) the optimal 
number of tests suggested, and that must be passed, explodes for m = 15, (f = 14, 
leaving one(!) to be fielded), and is over half the lot size for m = 30; this in spite of 
a strong prior probability of single shot success. This requirement is much 
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reduced if two-weapon salvoes are fired, with expected gain much higher as 
well. But the two-missile salvoes only apply to onehalf as many missions. 
For the large missile lot of rn = 100 it is again apparent that the possible loss of 
a highly expensive platform (ve = 25, vs. vw = 1) implies that conservative testing 
be done: in this case fielding is recommended if just over onethird of the lot is 
tested with, literally, no more than one failure allowed. But our methods allow 
estimation of expected gain whatever the test outcome, usefully informing a 
decision maker of the (conditional expected) gain whatever the test outcomes. 
This is more realistic in practice than is adherence to a "drop-dead" binary 
policy. 
There is apparently a premium on buying, and testing, relatively large missile 
lots. The unmodeled costs include that of the possibility that the opponent wil l  
adapt to or counter new designs or tactics (e.g. raise q, or change engagement 
conditions) before the lot is consumed. It is also possible that a new system 
design will render the current design items obsolete or degraded in storage 





a = 5, /3 = 1, vw = 1, q = 0.7 
One-Weapon Salvo 




Prob. of AU Expected # of Successes 
Successes (Std. Dev.) 
0.25 12.5 (2.5) 
0.14 25 (4.6) 
Testing: Optimal Number of Tests and Risks 
a=5, B = l ,  v w = l ,  q=0.7 
One-Weapon Salvo 
vl m Optimal Min.#of Max. Conditional 
# of tests Successes Gain Expected 




5 15 1 1 4.2 0.86 
15 15 9 9 0.5 0.93 
25 15 14 14 0.02 0.95 
5 30 2 2 8.8 0.86 
15 30 11 11 1.92 0.94 
25 30 18 18 0.60 0.96 
Conditional Expected 
Prob. of AU Number of 
Successes in Successes in 
Remaining Remaining 
Missiles Missiles 
Given Accept (Std. Dev.) 
0.3 12 (2.12) 
0.7 5.6 (0.70) 
0.95 . 0.95 (0.05) 
0.2 24.5 (3.5) 
0.46 17.9 (1.45) 
0.66 11.5 (0.83) 
12 
m Expected hob. of Rob. of All Expected # of Successes 




0.95 0.78 6.67 (0.75) 








Optimal &.#of Max. Conditional Conditional Expected 
## of tests Successes Gain Expected Prob. of All Number of 
Needed to Prob. of Successes in Successes in 
Accept Success Remaining Remaining 
Given Missiles MisSil€!S 
Accept Given Accept (Std. Dev.) 
0 0 5.5 0.95 0.78 6.67 (0.75) 
1 1 3.4 0.96 0.82 6.75 (0.62) 
3 3 2.2 0.98 0.89 5.87 (0.42) 
0 0 11.0 0.95 0.66 14.3 (1.4) 
4 3 7.08 0.97 0.76 12.6 (0.86) 
6 5 5.10 0.98 0.81 11.7 (0.66) 
vi rn Optimal -#of Max. 
#of Successes Gain 
tests Neededto 
Accept 
0 100 0 0 83.3 
5 100 10 8 33.3 
15 100 23 22 10.7 
25 100 37 36 5.2 
No 100 0 0 
testing 
Conditional Modeof Expected 
Expected Conditional Numberof 
Rob. of Dist. of # of Successes in 
Success Successesin Remaining 
Given Remaining Missiles 
Accept Missiles (Std. Dev.) 
0.89 Mode = 90 73.6 (8.6) 
0.95 Mode = 77 73.1 (3.8) 
0.97 Mode = 63 60.9 (2.4) 





ve m Optimal 
#of 
tests 
5 100 0 
15 100 8 
25 100 10 
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